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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
if he bad discounted it." These cases hold there is nothing in the
fact that an acceptor or maker of an indorsed note has it in posses-
sion and offers it for discount before its maturity, to give notice to
a purchaser of its payment or extinguishment. Their doctrine is
that one who discounts such a note for the maker, before it is due
according to its tenor, is an innocent holder for value, and is
entitled to recover against any of the parties to it. They cover
the present case, and they appear to be supported by sound reason.
It follows that the plaintiff in error could not have been hurt by
the admission of the contents of Shaner's letter.
And there is nothing else in the record of which he has any
reason to complain.
The judgment is affirmed.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.'
Criminal Law-False Pretences.-An indictment for obtaining pro-
perty by false pretences must show that the accused represented that
certain facts existed, and that such representations caused the owner to
part with his property, and must further show that the statements which
induced the owner to part with his property are untrue : State vs. Tomlin.
A mere opinion or supposition that certain facts exist is not sufficient:
Ia.
A representation to a creditor that his debtor is insolvent, and is largely
indebted, and that he is possessed of only small mean's, and is unable to
pay the debt, thereby inducing the creditor to part with his claim at a
sacrifice, when in fact such representations are untrue, and the debtor is
able to pay, is obtaining property under false pretences, for which an
indictment will lie: Id.
Vendor and Vendee-Deed in, Escrow-Death of Vendor.-Where land
Ls sold, a part of the purchase-money paid, and a deed executed and
I From Andrew Dutcher, Esq., State Reporter, to appear in the 5th volume of
bis Reports.
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planted in the hands of a third person to be delivered to the grantee, and
the balance of the purchase-money to be paid on the happening of a
certain event, if the grantor die before the event happens the title to the
land does not vest in the purchaser, but descends to the heirs of the
vendor, subject to the equitable rights of the purchaser: T'eneick vs.
Fiagg.
If the heirs of the vendor afterwards make -a deed to the purchaser,
and the purchase-money is paid over to the vendor's administrator, such
administrator will not hold the money as a part of.the estate of the vendor,
but will hold it as an individual for the heirs as their property, and an
action will lie against him to recover it: Id.
The deed given by the heirs is an absolute title for the land; it is not
a deed of confirmation, because there had been no previous deed delivered
nor estate created to be confirmed: Id.
Trustee-Presumtion of Conveyance and Surrender ro cestui gue trust
-tortgage;-A deed was made to J. G. B., Trustee of the Lexington
and Danville Railroad Company of Kentucky, of the second part, the
habendum and tevendum clauses and the covenants being to said party
of the second part, his heirs and assigns, held, that on the face of the deed
it showed a grant to J. G. B., and not to him in trust for the company:
Brown vs. Conzbs et al.
The railroad company executed a mortgage to J. G. B. and others, and
J. G. B. made agreements for the culture of the lands, in which he styles
himself as agent, and signs as such. Heid, that these circumstances,
together with the deed, being made to him as trustee, &c., were sufficient
evidence that the property was conveyed to J. G. B. in trust for the com-
pany, and that it was a mere naked trust: held, also, that taking a mort-
gage from the company, and acting as agent as above stated, were incon-
sistent with his character as trustee, and were sufficient evidence from
which to presume a surrender of the trust and conveyance of the land to
the company: Id.
To establish a trust, no particular form of expression is necessary in a
deed; it cannot be declared by parol, but may be created by any writing
showing that a trust is intended: Id.
A cestui que trust cannot recover in ejeetment against his trustee unless
a surrender to him of the legal estate can be reasonably presumed. He
has no alternative but to bring the action against a stranger in the name
of his trustee: Id.
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A trustee, as tenant of the legal estate, may recover in ejeetment from
his own cestui que trust, and the cestui gue trust has no defence to the
action at law; his only remedy is to sue out an injunction in a court of
equity : Id.
A surrender of the trust, and a conveyance thereof by the trustee, may
be presumed when the object of the trust has been accomplished: Id.
A mortgagee by taking a mortgage assents to his mortgagor's right to
execute it, and is estopped from denying the mortgagor's. title: Id.
Where a mortgage is given to A. B. and C. to secure them as indors-
ers for the mortgagor, if (. is in possession of the premises, and A. and B.
bring an action of ejectment against him to recover the land, if the plain-
tiffs are entitled to recover they will obtain the whole premises, unless the
defendant can prove damage to him by payment of or liability on some
of the bills of exchange or notes against which he was to be indemnified
by the mortgage : Id.
Common Recovery--Presumtion of Conveyance or Surrender to make
a Tenant by the Precipe.-H. R., by his last will and testament, devised
certain lands to I. B. "during his life, and then to the heirs of his body
for ever." On the third day of Juine, 1799, I. R. conveyed the premises
to I. H. and W. M. by deed of bargain and sale, with covenant of war-
ranty and covenant for further assurance. He also executed to the
grantees a bond conditioned that he would suffer a common recovery,
whereby the entailment of the premises should be broken, and a good
title in fee simple vested in the grantees. On the 12th of June, 1799,
an act was passed abolishing fines and recoveries. H. and M. divided the
land, and I. conveyed his share to W. H., April 29, 1806. On the 8th
of June, 1806, a special act was passed to authorize I. R. to suffer a
common recovery. He then executed a deed tripartite with J . V., as
the recoverer, and 0. E., as the tenant to the precipe, reciting that I.
and M. had reconveyed the whole premises to him. Judgment of recovery
was rendered September 2, 1806, and on the 13th I. R. conveyed the
whole premises to H. and MI. in fee simple. It did not appear that W. H.
ever reconveyed to M., or that he had possession of the premises pre-
vious to the recovery. W. H. and those claiming under him occupied
the premises from March, 1807, to the commencement of this suit, a
period of over forty years:
Held, that the facts warranted the presumption of a surrender by W.
ff. to M., which enabled M. to make such surrender to I. R. as gave the
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latter power to make a good tenant to the precipe : held, also, that the
recovery was legal, and under the conveyances and proceedings a good
title in fee simple was vested in W. H. : Id.
Deed-Reservation of Entry to Repair, &c., Dams.-A deed of convey-
ance to the Central Railroad Company contained the following reservation,
viz.: excepting and reserving to the said MI. S., his heirs and assigns for
ever, the right and privilege to keep up and retain on said premises the
small house and yard thereto attached, as the same is now located, for
ever, and also the right and privilege to enter upon said premises from
time to time to make, amend, and repair his mill-dams, and to remove
from the pond the manure that may there accumulate from time to time.
Held, that by that reservation the grantor, and those claiming under him,
had the right to enter upon the premises not only to amend and repair
the dam, but to keep up and maintain all dams upon the premises in the
same condition in which they were at the time of making the deed of
conveyance, and that the grantees had not the right to take down or
remove the dams, or any part thereof: Valentine vs. The Central Rail-
-road Company of New Jersey.
The grantor made an agreement with the company, granting to them
the right and privilege to extend, widen, and strengthen their embank-
ment by the use of his lands, and relinquishing to them all claim for
damages that might arise from the use of the rights and privileges thus
granted, and also re]inquishing all claim for damages which he had pre-
viously sustained at their hands. ield, that this agreement did not give to
the company any right to take down or remove any part of the dam: Id.
Ways-Right to erect Gates.-The statutory right to erect swinging
gates across private and by-roads extends to all ways except such as come
within the description of public roads: Stevens vs. Allen.
XAunicipaZ Corporaions-Improvements, Assessments for.-fiere the
charter of a city provides that the expense of improvements, when com-
pleted, shall be ascertained and assessed by three impartial commissioners,.
to be appointed by the common council, the corporation has not the power
to establish a board of commissioners of assessments who shall act in all
cases. The commissioners must'be appointed for each specific case: T7e
State vs. The Mayor and Common Council of the City of fiudson.
Where a city charter requires property to he assessed to pay for im-
provements according to the benefits received, it is not sufficicnt to assess
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each lot according to its frontage. The commissioners must exercise their
judgment as to the amount of benefit each lot receives, and must assess
the property accordingly, and the report must show that the assessment
has been so made: Id.
Parent and Child-Rigt1t of Father to Wages-Einancipation.-A
father may claim for services rendered by his son, a master by his appren-
tice or hired laborer, and may charge for it as done by himself: Brown
vs. Ramsay.
Where a father sues for labor performed by his son, the plaintiff must
prove that he is the principal in doing the work and the son the agent.
either in fact or in law, and either that the son, being emancipated, was
working under him as his servant, or that he was not emancipated or was
incapable of emancipation: Id.
On a certiorari from the Court of Common Pleas this Court will not
review the decision of the Court below on questions of fact; but where
the question is a mixed one of law and fact, the only inquiry here is
whether there was a mistake or misapplication of the law by the Court
below: Id.
If there is legal evidence before the Court below, upon which they can
reach the conclusion to which they arrive, this Court will not reverse the
judgment because the evidence would bring them to a different conclu-
sion : Id.
The right of the father to the services of his child ceases on the child's
attaining the age of twenty-one years, and it is then the right of the child
to receive its own wages; but arriving at the age of twenty-one is not
ipsofacto emancipation; the child may elect to remain with the parent or
may be incapable of emancipation, and if it so remain, or such incapacity
exists, the parent will be entitled to the child's wages : d.
Whether a child has been emancipated or not, or is incapable of eman-
cipation by imbecility or otherwise, are questions of fact to be decided by
the peculiar circumstances of each case: Id.
A child may be emancipated by the act of the father and without the
election of the child, as where the father turns the child from his house,
and will not permit it to remain at home in his family: id.
The law will not presume any change in the relation of parent and
child from the mere fact that the child has arrived at the age of twenty.
one 17.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.'
Evidence-Examination of Witness-1'rivilege.--On the cross-exami-
nation of a witness he cannot be asked whether he had been convicted
of petit larceny, although he do not object. The party has a right to
insist that the fact be proved, if at all, by the record: Airewcomb vs.
Griswold.
So also the party may object, though the witness do not, to a question
whether the latter had made certain statements in an affidavit which was
not produced: Id.
.Married Woman-Separate Froperty, Liabilty for Husband's Debt.-
A wife, by allowing chattels belonging to her, and which remain in Specie,
to be employed by her husband in the carrying on of a business for their
common benefit, does not devote them to her husband so as to render
them liable for his debts: Sherman vs. Elder et al.
Otherwise, it seems, as to articles used by the husband as merchandise,
whether a part of the goods belonging to the wife before marriage, or
purchased out of the earnings and accumulations of the business: Per
ALLEN, J.: Id.
An assignment by the wife of the goods and chattels, ," as well as all
claims and demands for any portion of them," is valid, and carries the
rigt of action for the taking by a creditor of that part of her property
which remained in specie and was not made merchandise, though used by
the husband in his business: Id.
UslJry-Mortgage-Conveance subject to a .Aortgage Debt.-Where
land is conveyed subject to a usurious mortgage, which the grantee
assumes to pay, the mortgagee acquires a right to an appropriation of the
land for that purpose, which cannot be divested without his assent:
.lartlej vs. Harrison et al.
Held, accordingly, that a subsequent arrangement between the parties
to the deed, whereby, as between them, it became a mere quit-claim, was
inoperative to open the defence of usury to the grantee: Id.
Qwere, however, whether the personal liability assumed by the rantee
is not discharged by the release pf his grantor. So held in the Supreme
Court, and the question not passed upon by this court: Id.
Jul(2 ment by Confessi6n-rad.-A judgment by confession entered
1 From E. P. Smith, Esq., State Reporter.
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upon an insufficient statement, but not impeached for actual fraud, is good
as between the parties .Miller vs. Earle.
Where the property of the defendant has been sold under an execution
upon such a judgment, the purchaser's title cannot be impeached by a
creditor having no judgment or lien on the property at the time of the
levy : 1d.
Saue-tur.hase with Design nzot to Pay-Fraud.-Though the omission
of a purchaser of goods for credit to disclose his insolvency is not necessarily
fraudulent, yet if the purchase be made with a preconceived design not to
pay, it is a fraud: ilennequin et al. vs. ]Vrhylor.
Such design may be inferred by the jury from the circumstances and
conduct of the vendee, not only in respect to the sale in question but in
other contemporaneous transactions : Id.
.Eoidence-Exemplnfication of Will.-The exemplification of the record
of a will, in order to be evidence, under ch. 94 of 1850, must contain the
proofs taken before the surrogate. A mere exemplification of the will,
recorded as having been proved, is insufficient: Bill et al. vs. Crockford.
Account- Where it -Lies.-The action of account, at common law,
would only lie between two merchants. It was unavailable where the
partnership consisted of a larger number: Appleby vs. Brown.
The Revised Statutes (2 R. S., p. 385, § 49), though implying a different
understanding on the part of the legislature, did not change the law or
enlarge the cases in which the action might be brought: Id.
-Hig wayy- When it may be laid out over Railroad Track or Propery-
Constitutional Law.-A highway cannot be laid out over grounds acquired
by a railroad corporation for the site of an engine-house, &c., necessary
for its use at a station : The Albany Northern R. R. Cd. vs. Brownell et al.
An injunction suit will lie to restrain highway commissioners from
taking possession of such a site : Id.
It seems that an injunction suit will not lie in a case where the com-
missioners would have the right to lay out a highway, but fail to acquire
jurisdiction, or where their proceedings were irregular: Id.
The statute (ch. G2 of 1853), in authorizing the construction of high-
ways across railroad tracks without compensation, does not violate the
constitutional provisions against taking private property for public use or
impairing the obligation of contracts : Id.
The title which a railroad corporation acquires to its track is qualified
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as being taken for public use, and is subject to the exercise by the
legislature of all the powers to which the franchises of the corporation
are subject: Id.
Judgment by Confesson-ralidit.-A judgment by confession is valid
as between the parties, though the statement on which it is founded does
not conform to the Code in setting forth the origin and particulars of the
indebtedness: Neusbaum vs. Keim et al.
- Such a judgment, therefore, upon proof of its bonafides, authorizes the
creditor to impeach a fraudulent transfer by: his debtor: Id.
A statement, it seems, is sufficient under the Code, which, after declaring
that the plaintiff had sold and delivered to the debtor large quantities of
meat in 1854 and 1855, averred that there was justly due him, upon such
sales, a balance of $2114, with interest from January 18, 1855 : Id.
Inmsrance-Warrant/-"- .ree from Liens."-A marine policy of in-
surance "upon the whole tackle," &c., of a vessel, containing a warranty
that "the property is free from all liens," parol evidence is admissible
that the property insured, was the owner's equity of redemption in the
vessel which was subject to certain mortgages known to the insurer:
Bidiwell vs. The North Mestern Rs. Co.
The existence of such mortgages is no breach of the warranty: Id..
Sunday Law-Arewspa1per.-A contract for the .publication of an ad-
vertisement in a newspaper to be issued and sold on Sunday, is void:
Smith et al. vs. Wilcox et al.
.HabitZal Drunkard-Promssoiy Note, what Payment of.---The juris-
diction given to the Co'unty Courts for the 'custody of-habitual drunkards
(Code, § 30, sub. 8) is general, not limited to those having estates of lem
than $250: Davis vs. Spencer. 
I I.
The reference in subdivision elevenof the same section to thepowens
of the old Courts of Common Pleas in this matter does not limit the effect
of subdivision eight, but was intended to continue -in the County Court
cases then pending in the Cbmmon Pleas : Id.
An agreement between the payee of a note and the maker, ma with
the asseut of 'the latter's partner, to apply -the indebtedness of the payee
to such maker and his partner in payment of the note, operates in p)reaenti
as a satisfaction of the note 1pro tanto: Id.
Whether the assent of the partner was necessary or material : Qu ere'
id.
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SUPREtEMR COURT OF TN'W YORK.
Action for Specific Performance.-W hen it appears, or is conceded, on
the trial at a special term of an action for the specific performance of an
agreement to sell and convey real estate, that the defendant is not, and
never has been, able specifically to perform, the judge should decline to
proceed with the trial, and should send the action to the circuit, for trial:
Stevenson vs. Buxton.
The defendant, in such a case, has a right to have the question of
damages tried by a jury; of which the justice, at special term, cannot
deprive him, by a compulsory reference to a referee; particularly whern
the fact that the defendant never had title, and was not and never had
been able to specifically perform, is set up in the answer: Id.
Insurance-Transfer of Interest withnut (onsenzt-Isabilty upon Prt-
mium Note.-A clause, in a policy of insurance, providing that the inte.
rest of the assured in the policy, or in the property insured, is not assign-
able without the written consent of the insurers; and that in case of any
transfer or termination of such interest without such consent, the policy
shall be void and of no effect, is to be regarded as a provision made for
the exclusive benefit of the insurers, and to be practically exercised by
them or not, at their option: Tyatt, receiver, &c., vs. Wait.
If, after the assured has transferred his interest in the policy and in
the property insured, without the written consent of the insurers, the
latter choose to rectify the transfer, and to continue the- insurance, the
policy will not be absolutely void: Id.
And if, after notice of such transfer, they treat the assignee as a mem-
ber of the company, they will be estopped friom denying such ratification
and approval', .
Whether a policy of insurance be regarded as originally void, or only
voidable in consequence of an unauthorized transfer, it is nevertheless
conditionally susceptible of ratification and confirmation: -
Notwithstanding a policy be regarded as absolutely void, by reason of
an unauthorized transfer, so far as to prevent an action for a loss, by the
assured, against the company, the former is not released from the obliga-
tions of his deposit or premium note until he has complied with a condition
of the policy and charter, requiring "the payment of his proportion of all
losses and expenses that may have occurred prior to the surrender" of the
policy, or alienation of the property : Id.
The assured w.il rA -i liable upon his dexposit note, as well for losses
ocourring after as beire the alienation, until all assessments are paid : Id.
Notwithstanding a clause in the charter of a mutual insurance com-
pany, declaring that all persons who shall insure with the company, "so
long as tlw shall be insured in said company, shall be and continue mem-
bers thereof, and no longer," persons insured are still members of the
company, and liable to contribute for losses sustained, although they have
alienated the property without the written consent of the company: Id.
Rusband and WMt- WTife when a witness against Eusband-Parol
Promise of Husband, and Settlement in consideration thereof.-When
husband and wife are co-defendants, and their interests are not conflict-
ing, she is a competent witness in her own behalf, and may be examined
as to an agreement between them : Schuffncr vs. Reuter and oth ers.
Where a husband receives from his wife a sum of money belonging to
her absolutely, upon a parol promise to repay the same, he not being
indebted at the time, such parol promise, though void at law, is good in
equity: and the receipt of the money forms an equitable consideration
for the repayment thereof, or for a settlement of real estate of equivalent
value, and for a post-nuptial contract carrying such an arrangement into
effect: Id.
Where a conveyance, made by a husband to his wife, was no more than
a joint equivalent for the money borrowed by him of her, and was appa-
rently free from actual fraud, it was held that such conveyance, although
executed after a debt had been incurred by the husband, was supported
by the antecedent equitable obligation and consideration, and in legal
effect related back to that period. Id.
Mortgage--Condition that all shall become due on Default.-A condi-
tion, in a mortgage, that upon default in the payment of interest for twenty
days after due, the principal sum, together with all arrears of interest,
shall, at the option of the mortgagee, become due and payable immediately,
is not in the nature of a forfeiture, to be relieved against by a court of
equity, or which a court of equity will not enforce. " It is an agreement
which the parties have a right to make, and the extension of credit is
lawfully made dependent upon the punctual payment of interest: Valen.
tine vd. an Wagner.
Gertificate of Deposit, payable in " llinois Currency"-The plaintiffs
deposited money with the defendants, who were bankers, at Chicago,
receiving from them a certificate stating that the plaintiffs had "deposited
BPST.L,ACT,' 01: R.EU'-Ni £ ,ISIO-NS.
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in their office $1781.42, Ills. Cy., payable to the order of themselves."
Hedd, that the fair construction of the terms "Ills. Cy.," if applied tc
the payment of the certificate, was that the same might be paid in bills
of banks which at the time of payment were received and passed as ordi-
nary currency, in Illinois; but that payment could not be made in the
same bills which were deposited. And that it was error to hold that the
defendants were bound to pay in specie, or in bills which passed at par,
in Chicago: Hulbert and others vs. Carver and others.
Sheriff-Liability for Acts of his Deputfy-Authorit, of Deputy, hoto
proved-Impeaching Witnesses.-To render a sheriff liable for the acts of
his deputy, it is not necessary that he should be sued in his official capa-
city as sheriff and facts sufficient to charge him as such be set out in the
complaint: Curtis vs. Fay.
The sheriff's liability for the acts of his deputy, in the execution of
process, rests upon, the doctrine of principal and agent; and in all such
cases it is essential to. prove the agency, upon the trial, if the fact is
denied by the answer: id.
The authority of the deputy to act as the agent of the sheriff, and to
bind him by his acts, can only be proved by the production of his
appointment as deputy. It cannot be proved by a certified copy of such
appointment; nor by evidence that the deputy acted as such: Td.
One having no personal knowledge of the character of a witness, but
deriving his information solely from others whom he does not know, is
not qualified to testifyin relation to the witness's character or reputation:
Id.
An impeaching or sustaining witness is not to speak of the reputation
of the witness whose veracity is in question, unless he knows it; and
such knowledge must be founded upon an acquaintanbe and intercourse
with the neighbors and acquaintance of the witness, sufficient to enable
him to gather the general estimation in which such witness is held in
the community where he resides: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.'
Promissory Pote-Failure of Consideration-Patent.-The sale of the
right to make, use, and vend a patented invention which cannot be applied
to auy beneficial purpose, but is wholly worthless, is not a valid considera-
tion for a promissory note, although the parties acted in good faith and
botl" then believed the patent to be valuable: Lester vs. Palmer.
1 From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter of the Court.
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,,SMdppin.zg- 6 aIta'tr-Prty--Da'iatio om T'o yage.-Cbarterers of a
vessel for an entire voyage, who by themselves or their authorized agent
waive the terms of the charter-party and consent to and order a deviation
from the voyage agreed upon, are liable to pay the stipulated price, in
like manner as if the voyage originally contemplated had been performed;
and the fact that a memorandum of such consent and order is afterwards
written upon -the charter-party and signed by stLch agent with his own
name alone is immaterial: Baker vs. Fratt.
If A., being the authorized agent of the charterers of a vessel for an
entire voyage, instead of pursuing the voyage agreed upon, to I., consents
to abandon it, and signs a memorandum reciting that he has given orders
to the captain to keep the ship away for G., the captain deeming it inex-
pedient from the lateness of the season to visit I., but saying that he held
himself in readiness to make further effort to do so if required, the legal
effect of the memorandum and of the arrangement of which it is the
evidence is, an agreement to deviate from the original course of the voyage,
and not an abandonment of the charter-party; and the charterers are
liable for the stipulated price, although the prosecution of the original
course of the voyage had become impracticable by the perils of the seas,
and the voyage was in fact broken up; and although, after reaching G.,
a new agreement was made respecting the homeward voyage, in which
the questions affecting the rights of the parties under the charter-party
were reserved for future adjustment: Id.
Dower- Vendor and Fendee.-A-widow is not entitled to dower in land
in the possession of her husband at the time of his death, under an execu-
tory contract for the purchase thereof, the terms of which were not com-
plied with in his lifetime: Lobdell vs. Rayes.
Case-Liahilitl of Occztpier of Real Estate for Neyligence of Workrnall.
-The lessee of a building who has employed a carpenter to repair an
awning which extends from the building over a public way, with no
special contract as to the terms, price, or time of doing the work, is liable
for an injury sustained by one who is lawfully using the way, by reason
of the carelessness of the carpenter in making the repairs: .Brackett vs.
LuU~e.
,STpping-Liability for Supplics.-One who has taken and caused to
be recorded a bill of sale of an undivided share of a vessel, absolute in
terms, but intended only as collateral security for a debt, and has never
